December 28, 1977

This meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Party has fully confirmed the correctness and importance of the enlarged meeting of the same body in 1975, which discussed a great many questions, the chief one being the consolidation of the army. The assumption at that time was that consolidation should be accomplished by first reorganizing and restaffing the leading bodies. After that problem was solved, we planned to take up the problem of the army's technical equipment, because we simply could not afford to neglect it. Then would come the question of strategy, for without a clear-cut strategic orientation many things are difficult to deal with.

The present meeting has set 10 fighting tasks for the army and will be adopting nine documents, comprising decisions and regulations. In terms of the number of problems it is to solve and the range and variety of the subjects with which it has to deal, no meeting to match it has been held for years. It has prepared rules for almost every aspect of the army's work. Some earlier rules which were undermined by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four have been restored; others have been newly created; all are necessary for consolidating the army and preparing for the event of war. With these rules, we shall have something to go by and to help us achieve unity in understanding and in action.

This meeting is of great importance. The guidelines and decisions it adopts should be transmitted to different levels of the army and put into effect. When decisions are being made, it is easy for everyone to raise his hand in favour, but when it comes to carrying them out, things are not so simple. Some matters may be agreed upon in principle, but when specific problems arise that's a completely different affair. The key to implementing these decisions will be the personal example set by the senior cadres. If they go by the rules, it will be easy to persuade the whole army to do likewise. If they don't, everything will come to naught and things will go on as before.

Now let me discuss five points:

1. The question of exposing and criticizing the Gang of Four and consolidating the leading bodies.

On the whole, the movement to expose and criticize the Gang of Four is proceeding well in the army. In most units it is developing soundly and in depth, but in some it has yet to be deepened. In others, it has just begun to reveal the problems. And in still others a multitude of problems have been discovered, but their solution is being dragged out. There are also units in which no problems are apparent because people are sitting on the lid. In short, the movement is proceeding unevenly. In those units where it has not yet taken hold, the leading cadres should take the initiative and do everything possible to mobilize the masses, instead of curbing them with all kinds of restrictions. How can you tell what the problems are before the masses are mobilized? Where the movement is already being conducted in depth, the leading cadres should keep calm and be especially careful to observe policies. In making decisions about people, we should be cautious, distinguish strictly between the two different types of contradictions [those among the people and those between the people and their enemies], widen the area of education and narrow the scope of attack. We should check up thoroughly on matters and people involved in the Gang of Four's plot to usurp Party and state power. The army is the major instrument of our proletarian dictatorship. If the work in the army is not done well and its cadres are not reliable, we shall suffer much harm. Hence this is a matter of the utmost importance to the army. In the case of persons who made mistakes and, in particular, grave mistakes, we must expose and criticize their errors while at the same time creating the conditions necessary for them to mend their ways. We should help them make the necessary self-criticisms, make a clean breast of their mistakes before the masses, and secure the latter's forgiveness. Then we should settle their cases in the proper ways. We cannot refrain from exposing and criticizing mistakes and let those who made them slip away just because their cases fall within the category of contradictions among the people. If we do that, we shall leave the deeper sources of disturbance untouched, and there will be more ``earthquakes'' to come. What's more, that is not really the way to show concern for cadres, rather it will do them harm because they won't have learned the necessary lessons. We have already seen how some of these people can slide away from one mistake after another without learning any lessons. Beyond all doubt, we must crack down resolutely on the unrepentant diehards among the sworn followers of the Gang of Four. But we should deal leniently with those followers of the Gang and participants in its factional activities who are willing to make amends and thoroughly expose the crimes of the Gang and its faction -- once what they say proves to be true. We should not entrust important jobs to persons who have made grave mistakes and whose attitude remains bad; they should be deprived of their current ranks and perquisites.

In the process of reorganizing and restaffing the leading bodies, we should not, of course, admit into these bodies anyone who has participated in the plot of the Gang of Four to usurp Party and state power. The following types of people should be excluded. Those who always sail with the wind, who continually slide away from their mistakes, or who cause serious disturbances; those who have made grave mistakes and have a bad attitude; and questionable persons whose cases have not been cleared up. There are also others whom we should not recruit into leading bodies or place in important posts. They include: persons who exercised a fascist dictatorship and acted tyrannically; persons who engaged in beating, smashing and looting (these latter, of course, are not likely to be among the high-ranking cadres, for the Gang of Four employed lackeys to do such things and to act as secret agents or informers within our ranks); persons who serve their own interests through trickery and swindling; persons who are adept at mutual flattery and the exchange of favours and who are keen on factional activities; skilled political tricksters or specialists in ``knifing'' people; petty operators who are always manoeuvring; and persons whose revolutionary will has waned and who are content to eat three square meals a day and do nothing. All this means that when we reorganize the leading bodies at various levels, and especially when we choose the cadres who will be first and second in command in their units, it is not enough merely to make sure that candidates were not involved in the plots of the Gang of Four. For there is another category of persons who have little or no connection with the Gang of Four but who are, nevertheless, politically unsound and ideologically anti-Marxist, or who have perpetrated many evil deeds which have earned them the people's hatred -- persons who are, in fact, bad elements. Not only should such types never be admitted into leading bodies, they should not be allowed to remain in the army. However, some leading comrades still don't recognize these people for what they really are, and we should be aware of this problem. Here I am talking not only about the selection of veteran cadres but also, and particularly, about the choice of younger ones. We must select the right young cadres, for they will take over from us in the future. We have had plenty of sad experience in making the wrong choice.

We should judge our cadres in an overall way and from a historical perspective. Those who gave good service in the long years of revolutionary struggle but made mistakes or said wrong things at one time or another should be helped to correct their mistakes through proper criticism and self-criticism. By judging cadres from a historical perspective we mean that we should take into account not only their earlier records but also their showing in the struggles against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. Some people followed first Lin Biao and later the Gang of Four, committing errors and doing evil deeds. This, of course, is part of their history. We have many veteran comrades in the army and, generally speaking, their common characteristic is that they are very honest and upright. Of course, a few of them have changed somewhat. So it isn't easy to judge people. If we want to select the right ones, we must understand and judge cadres on the basis of their behaviour in practical struggle.

What kind of people should we select for future leading bodies? We should select serious students of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought who can stand the tests of struggle; people who are strong in Party spirit and capable of co-operating with others and resisting undesirable practices; people who believe in hard work and plain living, who seek truth from facts and are upright and honest in word and deed; people who work conscientiously, keep in close contact with the masses and are concerned about their well-being, and are bold, resolute, experienced and professionally competent. At present, our leading cadres are rather elderly. Five years from now there will be few who are under 50 and who have had experience in war. So we veteran comrades must attend seriously to the selection of successors and we must help and guide the younger cadres and pass on our experience to them.

In 1975, I proposed that we should solve the problems of weakness, laziness and laxity in the leading bodies. Through two years of practice, especially through the struggle against the Gang of Four, it has now become clear that weakness consists in allowing fear to override all other considerations, in deviating from principle, and going along with undesirable tendencies instead of resisting them; that laziness means a waning revolutionary will that is manifested in failure to read books and periodicals, to use one's brains or to go down to the grass-roots units -- and also in a fondness for eating and aversion to work; and that laxity concerning principle consists in contending for power and gain, doing things destructive of unity and refusing to co-operate with others for a common purpose. Some cadres regard themselves as infallible, foster a new version of the ``mountain-stronghold'' mentality, and exercise favouritism in making appointments. They have their own standards for judging cadres, try to gather supporters around them and elbow other people aside. They are always trying to form a circle of their own, thinking that they won't get anything done otherwise. Some people, in recent years, have been tainted with these vices of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. We should act without delay to consolidate our leading bodies and quickly eliminate the weakness, laziness and laxity with which they are afflicted.

Here I shall also mention the problem of bloating. Some time ago, I summed up the problems in the army as bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia. So far, we have not solved the first problem, that of bloating: we've not yet created a new structure for our army. In trying to do so, we have failed to make it sufficiently clear that there must be streamlining and no overstaffing. Though ours is a big army, its companies are not adequately staffed. On the other hand, various army offices are overstaffed, or seriously bloated. It has become the fashion to set up new offices and sign up more personnel whenever there is a problem to be solved. This is a bad practice. Some new offices are set up by drawing staff members from the basic units. Why can't we use the existing offices? Of course, some offices are no longer useful and we should reorganize them. If now we cut back in accordance with the newly determined size and structure of the army, will we still have more streamlining to do in the future? Yes, we will. But it will mostly involve the leading bodies and offices at various levels, starting with those directly under the general headquarters and the headquarters of the various services and arms, and working down to those under the greater and provincial military regions. Of course, after the current streamlining and the fixing of the size of each unit, the whole army should remain organizationally stable for a certain period.

Now that we have carried out the necessary reassignment and interchange of leading personnel among the greater military regions and the various services and arms, there should be no further changes in leadership for a certain period, except in individual cases. After this meeting, we will begin reassignment of cadres at the army and divisional levels. We must see to it that, under the leadership of the General Political Department, all the greater military regions and all services and arms do well in this work. When we refer to the cadres at the army and divisional levels, we include not only those in the combat forces but also those in the general headquarters and offices of the different services and arms and the greater military regions. In reorganizing the leading bodies at these two levels, we should take particular care with the cadre sections of the political departments, selecting good comrades who are honest and upright, who resist undesirable practices and who dare to think and to speak their minds. During the reorganization, we should pay careful attention to selecting the key leaders of these sections so that the latter can function properly.

2. The general situation.

The domestic situation is very good. However, we must not become complacent, but must be aware of the difficulties, problems and shortcomings in our work. In some places the problems have piled up. In addition to correct principles, resolute measures and effective policies are required, and we must go on solving the problems one by one. This holds true in the army, as it does elsewhere. Of course, we are confident that everything will go well if we are conscientious. Some comrades have said in the group discussions that we may complete the consolidation of the army somewhat ahead of schedule if things go smoothly. I believe this too. The army has the advantage of being a highly centralized organization which can go into action fast.

The international situation is also good. It is possible that we may gain some additional time free of war. Applying Comrade Mao Zedong's strategy of differentiating the three worlds and following his line in foreign affairs, we can contribute our share to the international struggle against hegemonism. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not yet finished its global strategic deployment. And the global strategy of the United States, after its defeat in Southeast Asia, has shifted to the defensive -- the United States isn't ready to fight a world war yet either. Therefore, it is possible to win a delay in the outbreak of war.

However, I want to emphasize that we are in a race against time. Although the outbreak of war may be delayed, we cannot consider only this possibility but should also prepare for the possibility that some countries may want to fight a big war, and soon. For the hegemonists are desperate, and no one can tell for sure when or where some small incident they create may provoke a war. Although a world war may be delayed, accidental or local happenings are hard to predict. We should ask ourselves: What if the enemy were to invade us now? We ought to be able to answer: We can fight, even today. First of all, we should quickly check up on our fortifications. Ammunition should be ready; without it we can do nothing if war comes. We used to capture our ammunition from the enemy, but where can we capture it if war breaks out now? That's why we must have our own rear services. No matter when a war breaks out, now or in future, we must have our own fortifications and ammunition. Moreover, we should lose no time in training our troops so as to raise their combat effectiveness and their morale. Some people abroad say that technology decides everything. Don't place blind faith in that. Of course, we cannot afford to neglect technology. However, the notion that electronic computers can take over all the command functions is absurd -- then men would have no active role at all. Experience shows that, even if the enemy were to come now, we would be able to fight him with our present weapons and eventually win the war, provided we persevered in people's war. With such a huge population, once our people and army unite as one, no enemy can destroy us. Nonetheless, we must strive to gain more time, to improve our military equipment and educate and train our army well so as to reduce unnecessary losses. If we can gain a relatively long time free of war, that will enable us to continue modernizing the army, raising its combat effectiveness and making our preparations for defence. Here I would like to say that, even if we can gain 10 or 20 years in which to modernize our army's equipment, it will still be inferior to the enemy's. For the enemy won't be sleeping while we are advancing. Therefore, if and when war breaks out, we will still have to triumph over superior forces with our inferior equipment. This basic situation cannot as yet be completely changed. Our experience has always shown that we can defeat a superior enemy with inferior equipment, for our wars are just, they are people's wars. In this respect, we should be fully confident.

To sum up, war may break out any day. We must on no account waste time but should step up our preparations and, in particular, step up the training of our cadres in the art of directing modern warfare. And we must know our limitations in this respect. Our military equipment is being modernized, but are our cadres, including the veteran comrades present here, capable of directing a modern war? We mustn't think that it's enough for us to have fought many brilliant battles in the past and to have received many awards for meritorious service. Can we handle the new military equipment? Do we understand it? Are we fully capable of directing a war in which it will be used? Even if we ourselves have this capacity, what about our subordinates? No one can become capable without training. Therefore, great efforts should be put into increasing our cadres' ability to direct modern warfare. That's one point. Another point is that the improvement of our army's equipment must be speeded up. But we must take note of one condition, namely, that we proceed from actual possibilities. The state budget is limited and, moreover, the amount of our military expenditures has to be decided with a view to the overall balance. Our national defence can be modernized only on the basis of the industrial and agricultural development of the country as a whole. However, if we do our work well, we can speed up the improvement of our military equipment within the country's present capabilities.

3. The question of the army's becoming a big school.

We have made two decisions concerning the education and training of our army, one affecting military schools and the other the various units. I won't go deeply into these matters here. Our present problem is the need to strengthen education in the army itself, to strengthen the training of the cadres. Another problem is that some of our army cadres are not made welcome when they are transferred out of the army to civilian work, and that they do not, in fact, prove as useful as those who were transferred there in former years. We should investigate this problem and solve it. Comrade Mao Zedong said long ago that the army should be made into a big school. Under the new circumstances, it is of particular importance to stress the necessity of following this directive. Several hundred thousand cadres are going to be transferred to civilian jobs. This work was suspended for two years owing to interference and sabotage by the Gang of Four. From now on, large numbers of army cadres will be shifted to civilian work every year, which means that they will be transferred out of the army to the various fronts of socialist construction. How can we help them to adapt to the new tasks as quickly as possible? The method is to create the conditions that will fit them for work in the civilian units. And one way is to add the appropriate content to our army education and training programmes. When we say that we should give strategic significance to education and training, we mean that we ought to make the army a big school which instructs the cadres not only in modern warfare but also in modern science and production, and in methods of doing political and administrative work. Thus trained, our cadres will be able to play their role both in building up the army and in civilian work, and to fight in the event of war. That is to say, they will become cadres able to serve both in the army and in civilian units.

In the course of their education and training, cadres should study the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Comrade Mao Zedong, learn to know modern warfare, develop a fine ideology and style of work, and reach a fair level of command and administrative ability. We should also help them acquire some practical knowledge of industry and agriculture, and some elements of modern science, history, geography and foreign languages. Where possible, they should learn specific skills, such as driving motor vehicles and tractors, as well as some related theory. With time more and more army comrades will possess varied knowledge as well as specific skills. Army departments in charge of education and training should work out plans in this regard and take concrete steps to implement them. Comrade Mao Zedong urged that our cadres acquire diversified knowledge. For a number of years, owing to the interference and sabotage by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, some of our cadres were left without such knowledge and some of them even picked up bad habits so that they were not welcomed in the civilian units. Education and training to prepare army cadres to work in civilian units will help to advance national construction, army building and preparedness in the event of war.

A great many cadres are about to be transferred to civilian work. We should run training classes for them, arrange visits to some places, invite comrades from civilian units to pass on their experience to them, and help them acquire more knowledge of industry, finance, trade, political science and law, culture, and education. This applies to all cadres slated for transfer to civilian work.

With about one million soldiers being demobilized each year, we must confront the question of how to prepare them to play their part better in civilian work. Through education and training we should help them acquire a variety of skills. In addition to studying politics, technical skills and military affairs, they should receive some instruction in mathematics, physics, chemistry, industry, agriculture and foreign languages. I don't mean that each soldier should have to study all these subjects. But with proper arrangements and organizational work, the acquisition of some knowledge of the subjects I have mentioned will prove useful. Comrade Mao Zedong asked the soldiers of Unit 8341 to study cultural subjects and make social investigations. A big proportion of our soldiers now are middle school graduates. If, during their military service, they can raise their overall level through training and cultivate a good style of work, they will be able to make significant contributions in civilian units when they are transferred there, and consequently will be welcomed by them.

We should have a bit more diversity in our army. It is not enough to consider only the needs of the army itself but also what will be required of our officers and soldiers when they return to civilian work. Let's say a regimental cadre is transferred to a factory -- even a small or medium-sized one, not to mention a big one -- can he serve as a competent leader there? Not necessarily, it seems. As far as seniority and experience are concerned, a man who can command a regiment should be able to function as a leader of a medium-sized or small factory or of a workshop in a large factory, provided he has acquired some solid knowledge and skills and has really tempered himself. We should create the conditions which will allow cadres to do so. Of course, after their transfer to the civilian units, they can continue to study or take up political and administrative work. But not all ex-army cadres can be assigned to jobs of that kind, if only because there are not enough of them to go around. After all, some will have to do technical work, which is why they should acquire varied knowledge. We should give our officers and soldiers the necessary training so that they can both fight battles and participate in socialist construction. Today, many of our cadres don't know how to administer the affairs of the army units, and this includes cadres in the companies. Quite a few mishaps result from the intensification of contradictions that takes place when cadres are incompetent administrators and don't know how to do ideological work or to solve problems directly related to people. We have often discussed this problem. And how about cadres at the regimental and divisional levels? Many of them don't know how to administer their units either. If they are to do a better job, their administrative ability must be raised. To be a good administrator mainly means to be skilled at solving people's problems. In the early days after Liberation, a large number of cadres in north China went to the South where some of the company cadres became secretaries of county Party committees, and they did pretty well. This was because they worked hard, kept in contact with the masses, had a good style of work, were not boastful, and obeyed orders and directives from above. Therefore, even though they didn't have much general education, they were successful in their work. Things are different nowadays -- some army cadres are quite conceited and have the highest opinion of themselves. In 1975 I said, ``Uncle Lei Feng isn't around any more.'' For this, the Gang of Four wantonly attacked and vilified me, but actually that was only what the masses were saying -- I didn't invent the expression. In the past, our army was skilled in political work, but now some cadres who are transferred to civilian units prove inept. That's why army education and training should prepare the cadres to adapt themselves to civilian work. Otherwise, they will not be welcomed by the civilian units. Of course, there are also units in which no proper arrangements are made to receive them, and the comrades in such units should be alert to this.

4. The question of discipline.

We have had a special decision on this point, and I would like once again to emphasize its importance.

The army must maintain strict discipline and allow no laxity. Comrade Mao Zedong laid special stress on this during his last few years and, as many comrades know, he personally led the singing of the army song, The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention. The first of the three main rules of discipline is to obey orders in all our actions. In those years, when commanders were exchanged among the eight greater military regions, all of them reported for work at their now posts within 10 days. Comrade Mao Zedong knew the situation in the army very well. The question of discipline was raised in 1975 but wasn't resolved then, and it was set aside. Now it is necessary to raise it again, because one of the most valuable things we can do in helping and guiding the young and middle-aged cadres and passing on our experience to them is to make them understand the necessity of observing discipline. Our army has always insisted on the importance of obeying orders in all actions and of consciously observing revolutionary discipline. Otherwise, how could we have defeated an enemy far stronger than ourselves? Otherwise, how can we guarantee the Party's absolute leadership over the army and the implementation in it of the Party's line and policies? And otherwise, how can we speed up the process of revolutionizing and modernizing the army? Now we have some cadres who don't carry out directives or obey orders from above. This is a violation of discipline. In some units, there are a few people who have arrogantly practised factionalism for a long time. They are like tigers whose backsides no one dares to touch. But why shouldn't we dare? When told they are being transferred to another post, some cadres simply don't obey the order if it doesn't conform to their personal wishes. In 1975 one unit planned to transfer a number of people elsewhere. But they just refused to leave, on the ground that there had been no ''satisfactory explanation`` of what they called the rights and wrongs of their transfer. They acted with perfect assurance, thinking that they were quite justified in disobeying orders. At all costs, such persons must first be made to carry out orders; first they must go where they are told, and other things can be dealt with later. They can express their objections; they are entitled to their opinions. But those who refuse to go where ordered will be either compelled to do so and possibly demoted or else simply expelled from the army, because discipline must be enforced. If our army can't even achieve this, how can it be called an army? Of course, the leadership must be careful and prudent in making decisions, but that is another matter. At any rate, orders must be obeyed. Since there were many factions and factionalism was rife in the past, we must, of course, handle each case carefully. But this cannot serve as an excuse forever, and army discipline must be rigorously enforced. Another thing: some comrades who formerly lived and worked in large cities, especially Beijing, and have been transferred to other places, have obstinately refused to move their families despite repeated orders to do so. How can we allow this sort of thing? Generally speaking, when one is sent to work in a place, his family should move there too.

To consolidate the army, strict discipline must be enforced. We must firmly implement the guidelines and decisions adopted by this meeting. We must encourage everyone to put the general interest above everything else. Some things may seem right when viewed from a narrow perspective but prove wrong when viewed from a broader perspective -- and vice versa. In the final analysis, our primary concern must be for the overall interest. Army cadres must obey orders, and this should start with veterans who are required to set an example in observing discipline. As I said before, one point is obedience to orders in all actions, and another the willing observance of discipline. We should strengthen education on both these points.

Of course, there should also be democracy in our army, for without democracy there can be no voluntary observance of discipline. Comrade Mao Zedong always held that the army should practise democracy in three main areas, the political, the economic and the military. In each unit, leadership is exercised by the Party committee which practises both centralism and democracy. In the Party committee all important issues must be thoroughly discussed, and no one person should have the final say. The committee should encourage criticism and self-criticism among its members, and this should be made habitual. Our senior cadres should take part in the activities of their Party groups as other comrades do. The Party committees should see that they do so, even though the committees themselves have their own inner-Party life and can perform the function of mutual supervision and encouragement. Party branches at the company level should play a good role, and see to it that democratic procedures are followed in the three main areas. It goes without saying that political democracy must be given full scope in the army. With regard to military democracy, including that in education and training, it is necessary to persist in the practice of having officers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers, and soldiers teach each other. In the study of modern science, there are many cases where soldiers can teach officers. Soldiers who know more about science than their company commanders and political instructors, particularly soldiers in the technical units, should be asked to do this. We must also ensure economic democracy. We now have some cadres who encroach on the soldiers' interests. This cannot be allowed. The army units have economic committees, which should be strengthened so that they can play their proper role. This is part of political work. The accounts of each unit should be examined and made public every month. In our effort to develop democracy in the three main areas, we should begin with the companies and with the Party committees at various levels.

5. The question of unity.

Comrade Mao Zedong said that we should unite with the great majority, including those who had formerly opposed us and had since been proved wrong. We should not bear grudges against people who were once ''out to get`` us. Instead of harbouring resentment against comrades, we should forgive old wrongs. People like us can't be faultless, and we should allow others to criticize our shortcomings. We veteran cadres should set a good example in this respect. Of course, I'm referring to criticism and not to rumour-mongering, slander, abuse and groundless charges, none of which should be tolerated. We should unite and join forces against our common enemy and together expose and criticize the Gang of Four. That is the only way to implement the correct line regarding cadres, which requires that they be appointed on the basis of merit, and to unite with comrades who are good but have made mistakes. We must oppose factionalism, sectarianism and favouritism. We should give serious attention to the fact that some people are now bent on building small circles of supporters. Even after they have been transferred to other places, such people still interfere in the work of their original units and keep poking their noses into it. Why does this happen? What's the need of it? What's the good of it?

In seeking unity, we must observe the Party's principle of democratic centralism. Some people who pay lip-service to unity distort certain differences of opinion within a Party committee and leak them to the public; they spread rumours and slanders and try to win over groups of people in order to build support for themselves. Others sow discord. All these acts are divisive and therefore impermissible.

Comrade Mao Zedong always emphasized that unity is the guarantee of victory. In order to carry out the Party's line, achieve the splendid goal of the four modernizations and implement the guidelines laid down by this meeting, we must unite under the banner of Mao Zedong Thought and rally around the Central Committee. This is in our overall interest, and we should view all things from this broader perspective.

At this meeting the Military Commission has set us a heavy task, and time is pressing. So we must strengthen leadership, plan well and make our best effort to implement the relevant decisions. First of all, we must successfully reorganize and restaff the leading bodies at various levels. That is the only way to ensure the fulfilment of the various tasks facing the army.

(From Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II <1975-1982>)