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Why does US rev up China threat?
By Michael T. Klare (The Nation)
Updated: 2005-10-08 15:38
This campaign will take two forms: first, a drive to offset any future gains in Chinese military strength through permanent U.S. military-technological superiority; and second, what can only be described as the encirclement of China through the further acquisition of military bases and the establishment of American-led, anti-Chinese alliances. None of these efforts are being described as part of an explicit, coherent strategy of containment, but there is no doubt from the testimony of US officials that such a strategy is being implemented.
Elements of this strategy can be detected, for example, in the March 8 testimony of Adm. William Fallon, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), before the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It's certainly cause for concern to see this continuing buildup [by China]," he noted. "It seems to be more than might be required for their defense. We're certainly watching it very closely, [and] we're looking at how we match up against these capabilities."
To counter China's latest initiatives, Fallon called for improvements in U.S. antimissile and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, along with a deepening of military ties with America's old and new allies in the region. With respect to missile defense, for example, he stated that "an effective, integrated and tiered system against ballistic missiles" should be "a top priority for development." Such a system, in all likelihood, would be aimed at China's short-range missiles. He also called for establishment of a "robust and integrated ASW architecture" to "counter the proliferation of submarines in the Pacific."
Note that Fallon is not talking about a conflict that might occur in the central or eastern Pacific, within reach of America's shores; rather, he is talking about defeating Chinese forces in their home waters, on the western rim of the Pacific. That U.S. strategy is aimed at containing China to its home territory is further evident from the plans he described for enhanced military cooperation with U.S. allies in the region. These plans, encapsulated in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), were described by Fallon as "one of the primary means through which we extend U.S. influence, develop access and promote competence among potential coalition partners."
Typically, the cooperation will include the delivery of arms and military assistance, joint military maneuvers, regular consultation among senior military officials and, in some cases, expansion (or establishment) of U.S. military bases. In Japan, for example, PACOM is cooperating in the joint development of a regional ballistic missile defense system; in the Philippines it is assisting in the reorganization and modernization of national forces; in Singapore — which already plays host to visiting U.S. aircraft carriers — "we are exploring opportunities for expanded access to Singaporean facilities." And this is not the full extent of U.S. efforts to establish an anti-Chinese coalition in the region. In his March testimony Fallon also described efforts to woo India into the American orbit. "Our relationship with the Indian Integrated Defense Staff and the Indian Armed Services continues to grow," he noted. "U.S. and Indian security interests continue to converge as our military cooperation leads to a stronger strategic partnership."
All this and much more is described as an essentially defensive reaction to China's pursuit of forces considered in excess of its legitimate self-defense requirements — "outsized," as Secretary Rice described the Chinese military in a recent interview. One can argue, of course, about what constitutes an appropriate defense capacity for the world's most populous nation, but that's not the point — what matters is that any rational observer in Beijing can interpret Fallon's testimony (and the other developments described above) only as part of a concerted U.S. campaign to contain China and neutralize its military capabilities.
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