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China's development in high-tech national defence strategy
Lau Guan Kim Updated: 2004-03-06 09:16
The news in People's Daily on 2004-03-05 reported Premier Wen Jiabao stressed "efforts to modernize China's national defence and armed forces is an important guarantee for safeguarding national security and building a moderately prosperous society in all respects."
This means focusing on developing new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, fostering highly competent soldiers with special emphasis on modernising their knowledge of IT (Information Technology) application and mechanisation as the basis to enhance overall defence capability under high-tech conditions.
This brought to mind back in mid-1980s some thought by China to develop high-tech national defence. The name for this was gaojishu guofang zhanlie (高技術國防戰列).
By then it had already embraced Revolution in Military Affairs
Two wars impressed China:
(1) It was only after the 1991 Gulf War that China woke up to some hard realities. Mao's concept of people's war to draw in the enemy and sap his energy, to trade space for time and that numerical superiority could make up for inferiority in equipment is out of touch. Clearly the type of war presented by Desert Storm made obsolete all these cherished strategies of Mao Zedong fighting from a position of weakness in materials and equipment. The emphasis is on a leaner and force-projection PLA that can pack a powerful punch. Qualitative, rather than quantitative, has become the new doctrine in the PLA.
(2) America's Iraq War in 2003 and its swift and easy victory with minimal casualties.
As to its nuclear deterrence, from a position of relative weakness, 'hide' was the predominant tactic, but now with more confidence and advances made, and better trained in understanding wars under high-tech conditions, the new concept is 'fight'.
Like Colin Powell, in Desert Storm, "Use them or lose them," makes sense.
Past PLA's modernisations was driven by an obsolete military strategy (the doctrine of people's war under modern conditions). Now it got its guidelines right. Emphasis on special services, the air force, navy and the SMF (Strategic Missile Forces) fight future wars under high-tech conditions.
Deng Xiaoping arrived at the concept that the best defence is offence, and that instead of waiting for the enemy to just invade, the PLA must fight at the point of conflict, and be able to start a conflict right in the backyard of the aggressors as well.
But because of the priorities placed on the other three modernisations, defence was the least nurtured and cared for. That was because China concluded that there was no imminent danger of attacks from the USSR (now Russia) or the US in the short-term, and with that little assurance, having obtained a limited amount of high tech weaponry and achieving a limited level of deterrence for regional conflicts, it was in no hurry to catch up with the best armed forces of the world.
The Gulf War changed that. Chinese military though advance in thinking, is hampered by backward in equipment. The PLA is driven by powerful ambitions and challenged by genuine security threats.
Now the new thinking is that a sea battle in the Taiwan Strait is thought of as a likely scenario. This scenario is likely after 2020, because China is not in militarily prepared stage at this moment to have a final showdown with Taiwan. Its stance is to threaten war to prevent a war in the Strait.
Then, the spin-off is the spur to China's development of an advanced air force and a blue water navy. This is good for Chinese nationalism, but a dire consequence for Taiwan if it responds to reunification as sine die (no time limit).
All is not static at China's end.
Since 1994, China's qualitative edge has improved, as seen in the increased number of advanced aircraft bought from Russia, amphibious landing crafts, increased number of ICBMs and medium and short -range missiles.
Western opinion that China's military strength is impressive, but qualitatively it is far behind Taiwan has become the usual litany, but this is more a rhetoric than a realistic appraisal.
One suspects that in some understandable way, Taiwan could have been less transparent in its military spending. A cunning ploy is to place itself as militarily threatened by China's new acquisition of high-tech weaponry, and crying 'wolf' all the while to elicit more advanced arsenals from Uncle Sam.
Years back, contrary to Patrick Tyler's "A Great Wall," the authors J. Bruce Jacobs and Lijian Hong in their paper "China's Relationship with Taiwan," rule out military liberation on the following reasons:
1. The reduction of tension between China and Taiwan since 1979 makes it unlikely that the Chinese and military would opt for a military solution.
2. Taiwan has become important in China's current economic development, and this is more important for China than Taiwan.
3. The rapid economic growth in Taiwan enables it to buy expensive and more sophisticated weapons systems and military technology. China would then find it difficult to engage in an arms race with Taiwan.
4. The PLA cannot focus most of its military forces on Taiwan, as these are dispersed in defending other regions of China.
5. It is doubtful China can control the air and sea, a decisive factor for winning a war. Because of this weakness, China may have difficulty in transporting its troops to Taiwan without heavy casualties.
6. China may have a developed strategic nuclear force, but it seems almost impossible to use this in a 'civil war' against Taiwan. A destroyed Taiwan would have little to contribute to China. Besides, Taiwan has a developed nuclear industry and may already have some nuclear weapons.
7. China will take a longer time to master the use of high-tech weapons, compared with Taiwan's military.
Many of the above reasons are out of date, especially now that China officially admits that it has the neutron bomb that preserves buildings and other infrastructures, but destroys people.
Yet it is a matter of caution that now Chen Shui-bian is upgrading Taiwan's military hardware with a US$15 billion shopping list, more than China's defence budget for 2004
If Taiwan chooses the nuclear option, it is committing suicide. China's case will be very much strengthened.
The annihilation of 23 million Taiwanese is a grim scenario.
That China wants to take Taiwan because the latter is a rich price is simplistic. In matters of security, stability and unity, China will go all out for a military solution. China has professionalised the PLA, and all officers at least have tertiary degrees, and pilots in the PLAAF have relevant degrees from military colleges and universities.
Thus many of the views of Jacobs and Hong are not valid the 21st Century.
China will become a military superpower not by choice but by necessity. The negative side here is less will be spent on other areas in improving the lot of the Chinese hoi polloi. That may not be a problem, given the Chinese people's understanding of the threat to China.
As it is, the military spending by China is among the lowest, given its size and population. Relative to Japan and Taiwan, China's military budget pales.
Finally, China must not neglect its military upgrading, but do it at a pace that will not bring down its economic well-being.
Still, China's military posture is defensive.
Lau Guan Kim
Singapore
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| The above content represents the view of the author only. |
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