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Prospects of a Ma Yin-jeou administration
wchao37 Updated: 2005-07-21 10:35
Six years before its first centenary, the KMT is very much a "bai-nian lao-dian" mired down by years of incompetence, corruption, and irrelevance.
It was due to its gross incompetence that a Japanese-at-heart traitor could assume leadership of the Chinese party in order to carry out his own agenda of WILLFUL DESTRUCTION of the KMT party.
It was due to its omnipresent corruptive practices that the mere mention of "black-gold politics" in the media could smear its once-proud party stalwarts into oblivion and scuttle their efforts during both the 2000 and the 2004 'presidential' elections.
It was due to its irrelevance in the eyes of the young Islanders that oldsters like Lien and Soong saw no glimpse of hope in their winning the 2008 'presidential election' and had to relinquish their leadership roles in favor of the next generation of leaders.
From a revolutionary party organized by Sun Yat-sen to save China a century ago, it had metamorphosed into a joker's party used by Lee TH to catapult Chen SB into the acme of power in the 2000 election.
Most abhorrently, it even allowed Chen to use roguish rigmarole not only to get away with a fabricated pre-election shooting hoax in 2004 but also to withstand a subsequent challenge in the high courts.
Finally, coerced by the passage of Mainland's Anti-Secession Act in early 2005, it used its suddenly-reawakened Chinese soul to rationalize the top leaders' quick succession of visits to the mainland.
Against this background came the election on July 16, 2005 for party leadership in which Ma won by a landslide 375,056 (or 71.51 percent) of the votes cast by 50.17 percent of the KMT rank-and-file members.
Contrast this with the 3-24-2003 KMT election for party boss, in which Lien secured 520,000 or 57 % of the total number of possible votes, and this fact negates the first impression of a lopsided win by Ma in absolute terms.
So far the Mainlanders have been encouraged by developments in cross-strait exchanges with opposition parties on the Island. They are in Cloud Nine experiencing optimistic euphoria and caution is cast to the winds. Chinese re-unification seems to be at hand. The leaders of both the CCP and the KMT have exchanged polite pleasantries and congratulations.
Premium-priced Taiwanese fruits are going to Shanghai amidst an unprecedented typhoon, whilst Chinese tourist groups are earmarked to embark on their maiden journeys in the opposite direction at a moment's notice.
Ma had defeated the chameleon Chen once before during the 1998 Taipei mayoral race, and he is likely to claim victory again for the island's top post in 2008, and so conventional wisdom should tell you that the rest of the re-unification gambit will be a no-brainer sure bet.
Or so goes the rosy forecast.
Lost somewhere amidst this bandwagon mindset is the realization that although the final outcome of re-unification is a sure bet, events really do not quite hook up in the short run, and I'll explain why.
Remember that Chinadaily.com was the first in bringing notice to Ma Yin-jeou and his lifetime opportunity to contribute to the re-unification of the motherland in this forum (type "Ma Yin-jeou" in the content of both the "Talk to CD" and "Changing China" forums to bring up the posts) long before the possibility of the KMT reconciling and uniting with the CCP in a common stand against Taidu forces was entertained anywhere else.
The only difference was that Lien Chan made the first move and not Ma. I knew Ma was going to assume leadership of the KMT sooner or later and since he was from the younger generation, I pinned my hopes on him.
This was in spite of his coquettish relationship with the felongoons in Taipei.
What MArred the otherwise picture-perfect scenario was MA's public stand against the Anti-Secession Act passed with a margin of 2896 to 0 (with 2 abstentions) by the NPC, which proved to me that he really didn't understand Mainland aspirations and cross-strait dynamics, and at that moment I knew Ma had lost his lifetime opportunity to become a Chinese folk hero who could embark on the first trip of historical reconciliation between the two Chinese parties.
Ma's faux pas in opposing the ASA was so gross that it consequently prevented him from entering Hongkong SAR.
Yet, for the aim of eventual re-unification of the Chinese nation, all his faux pas will need to be glossed over.
In the next section the long-, short-, and medium-term prospects of a Ma administration on the Island will be examined.
What are the long, short, and medium-term prospects of a Ma administration?
The long-term (20 years and beyond) prospect is always good, no matter who's in office on the Island. Taiwan is returning to the embrace of the motherland no matter what the Taidus, the Japanese or the Americans might say or do.
This outcome is decided by historical megatrend geopolitical forces and this point cannot be over-emphasized as you read the following.
Here, we should understand that it is important for the prospective Taiwan leader to co-operate fully with the mainland government without asking for an impossible political quid pro quo in return. Ma is clearly not such a leader as is shown by his past history and Beijing should be expecting tough negotiations ahead with such a man - the first one of the new generation who has no emotional attachment to the mainland.
The short-term (1-3 years to the 2008 election) prospect is also good since Chen Suibian is presently hemmed in by recent cross-strait developments. He cannot just go ahead and declare de jure independence without permission by his American and Japanese sponsors.
With a substantial Sino-Soviet joint military exercise near Bohai Gulf just around the corner and Sino-Central Asian forces congealed into political solidarity badgering Bush for the first time to remove his forces from areas bordering Afghanistan during the recent SCO summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan. China's foes are not likely to pose a direct military challenge against her in the near future.
The medium-term (4-19 years) prospects of a Taiwan possibly under Ma's administration is equivocal, and here are my reasons:
1. Ma was born in colonial Hongkong and had never lived on the mainland. There was no umbilical cord attachment to the womb of the motherland as was obviously present in the case of the other leaders of the Pan-Blue Alliance -- Lien, Soong and Yok.
2. Ma had refused to join Lien and Soong to topple Chen's 'government' on the day when they had a chance outside the presidential palace in Taipei when it was apparent that the March 16, 2004 election was rigged and that the pre-election shootings were nothing more than a staged hoax.
In any other country (e.g. look at the American-sponsored 'colored revolutions' of former Soviet republics) such a public outcry against fraud would have led to change of government, but not in Taiwan. Why? Because the Americans were prepared in those 'colored revolutions' to dig in and they were also prepared to support Chen in the aftermath of the scandal.
The Lien-Soong supporters were not materially or financially prepared to stage a long-term protest including but not limited to camping outside the presidential grounds, and this fact alone attested to the non-sponsored spontaneity of the uproar against the fraudulent Chen as opposed to the American-sponsored violence during the colored revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Ma was like the pedestrian who failed to rescue a child who had run into an intersection in the path of oncoming traffic - just because the traffic light for his crossing was red. Ma purportedly wanted to act according to the letters of the law and would rather sue Chen later instead of toppling him right then, showing that at a crucial moment affecting the future of the Chinese nation, this man was too self-centered or simply harbored too many personal concerns - for he knew at the time that a Chen win in 2004 - even a stolen one -- would make him the party boss of the KMT for the 2008 election - a personal dream now coming true at the cost of placing the Chinese nation in great peril with Chen around for another crucial four years.
3. Ma's training in law at the City College of New York and then at Harvard means that his Weltanschauung or world outlook is largely shaped by Western legal perspectives. That, combined with his not having been born or lived on the mainland, makes it likely for him to quote from Harvard Law in lieu of Sun Yat-sen.
A man's upbringing determines his actions. Ma's lack of spontaneity whenever he greets his two daughters is very atypical of Chinese parents. So were his misguided views on the felongoon evil cultists and the Anti-Secession Act.
Conceivably China will face a much more vociferous figure in Ma than in the Chen-Lee-Lu clique, for his all-China-boy look is likely to seduce the mainlanders into believing that he is just another bona-fide Chinese politician -- when in actuality his thought patterns are very Westernized, and because of this difference, his future demands will be far more difficult for the Beijing government to accept.
4. Ma has simply too many "what-ifs" in his portfolio for the Chinese government to place full confidence in him. For instance, what if he demands recognition of the evil cult of felongoon? What if he coerces the CCP to exercise direct voting procedures in selecting China's national leader regardless of Chinese political realities? What if he proposes equal voting rights of the KMT on the mainland for national posts? What if he fights to have the military forces nationalized by the state, removing it from party control? Of course the Mainlanders can always say no, but then it would make the CCP look recalcitrant in the eyes of the Taiwan electorate if it refuses to go along with universal suffrage in national elections.
5. Ma's reply to Mainland's top leader congratulating him on his win mentioned only that he would strive for the welfare of the people on both sides of the straits, and that he approves better communication (presumably opting for san-tong or the three links) between them. He did not say he was proud to be a Chinese or give any hint as to his real self-identity. He had previously talked about fighting for a New Taiwan and not a New Taiwan PROVINCE of China. There are still many enigmatic queries about the man awaiting answers.
What's more, Ma lacked covert or overt support from either one of the two candidates who had gone to the mainland - Lien and Soong. There was a strong reason why both Lien and Soong cast their votes for Taiwan-born Wang and not Ma. As #2 above shows, both Lien and Soong had worked with Ma and found out the hard way how he operated during a crisis. Since this was not a beauty contest, both party leaders had opted to vote for the balding Wang Jin-ping and not the immaculate Ma with every hair in place.
6. Ma knows that the Taiwan-born, well-connected Wang Jinping enjoys strong intra-party support and has not yet agreed to serve as his deputy despite widely-publicized pre-election fanfare promises about sharing the limelight after the elections no matter who wins. Negative electioneering slogans had decidedly affected the relationship between the Ma and Wang, so much so that the latter might not be able to convert such negative feelings into positive action in time to support Ma for the 2008 election.
7. Ma is beset with many intra-party problems in addition to the ones mentioned in #6, not the least of which is how to undo the nearly-irreparable damage caused by Lee TH's willful destruction of the KMT; how to dispose of party assets; how to rescue the Party's poor image amongst the young; how to boost the morale of party members and work on credibility issues of the KMT amongst the general populace; how to fight endemic black gold and graft-taking traditions of the KMT; how to forge a strong alliance amongst the Pan-Blues; how to encourage intra-Party democratic processes; and how to continue on Lien Chan's political legacy of taking the CCP as a full partner in the fight against foreign supporters of the Taidu forces. The process should have started with the KMT leader himself and other than for the factor of youthful vigor, Ma is obviously not the best candidate when compared with the Lien-Soong-Yok trio.
8. Ma cannot be relied upon to support re-unification just because he is likely to endorse the 1992 Consensus as a basis for future negotiations. The CCP is looking for action and not mere words. A Ma administration may not necessarily give priority to accelerating the re-unification cause if the Taiwan economy recovers with Mainland's preferential treatment of the Island's compatriots to the extent that diehard Taidu provocateurs become cocky again and make unrealistic political demands on the mainland government. In fact, there is no guarantee that Ma will give an inch on the re-unification issue unless outrageous political demands are met by the CCP.
9. Ma is not likely to solve the endemic Taidu problem. The fundamental point is that the political parties in any country are created to compete for presenting the best plan to better the lot of the people, and not to change the fundamental Constitution upon which the government's rule is based - which is what the DPP is doing. So the so-called party politics in Taiwan does not wash because two of the contenders are not political parties (the Taiwan Union Party and the DPP) but are Hanjian organizations supported by foreigners. This important point should not be lost on the Taiwan electorate.
In other words in Taiwan there are presently only Hanjians and non-Hanjians, and not a working multi-party system. This is shown by the paucity of achievements of the Chen 'government' in improving the economic well-being of the people. The DPP and the TUP have shown us that they are interested only in political alienation and secession from the mainland, and not on matters concerning the welfare of the Islanders. That's why the two are not political parties in the strict sense of the term, but two motley gatherings of Hanjian thugs.
10. Ma has to understand that the mainland government cannot wait interminably for him to agree to re-unification after another fifty years. Time is of the essence as was spelt out in the ASA. The CCP cannot uphold Ma just because he looks like a good man with a nice haircut. The way the educative process is going on right now in Taiwan - with kids being taught that they are not Chinese and that the island should be viewed atop the mainland with Taipei on the west end and Gaoxiong to the east, and that their 'national' language is Minanhua and not Mandarin -- is criminally insane.
So far Ma has failed to show us that he understands the grave dangers inherent in the Hanjian educative process or else he would have tried to do something about it as Taipei's mayor.
| The above content represents the view of the author only. |
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