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What are the political intentions behind the movement to overthrow CY Leung as the Chief Executive of the SAR government?

The obvious political reason is neither sufficient, nor convincing. The issue of illegal structures at his home at most may be used to accuse Leung of negligence. But negligence in this case is not criminal. On the other hand, the construction of illegal structures by Henry Tang, the other leading contender in the chief executive contest, is now under criminal investigation because there may be an evidence of deliberate falsification of construction planning documents.

As Leung may have been negligent, we may say he is not perfect, but there is no moral requirement to be a perfect man for the position of chief executive. The argument that Leung is dishonest and therefore should step down from his position is rather weak and far-fetched. The Legislative Council could surely pass a motion of censure for whatever reason against Leung. Such a motion was introduced but failed to elicit enough votes. The introduction of the motion did not prove anything against Leung, because it was purely a partisan issue.

If there is no mistake on the part of Leung to warrant his resignation or removal, the motivation to remove him from office is therefore purely political. Political in this context could mean many things. First, those ardent supporters of Henry Tang have not been happy with his loss and are now trying to use whatever political means they have to discredit Leung and to build up a political momentum to call for his resignation so that Henry Tang has a chance to come back, at least for the simple purpose of revenge.

Second, those passionate anti-Communist and anti-Beijing government activists have long regarded Leung as a faithful follower of Beijing. Opposing him and his administration reaffirms their political stance. They might not be so naive to believe that they could dislodge Leung from his position by mere mass demonstrations, sit-ins and public disturbances like those on New Year's Day. They could entertain themselves the slight possibility that if they could amass half a million people for open demonstration against Leung, the Beijing government would give up its support for him. Some activists actually have presented this scenario in their blogs in a bid to mobilize more people to come out in demonstration.

Third, some overseas political organizations and individuals in support of an American style democracy and favoring a colorful revolution for political changes in China may like to create some problems in Hong Kong. They understand very well that it would be impossible given the present political situation in Hong Kong to revoke the Handover and call for independence. They would still like to promote anti-Chinese and pro-Hong Kong autonomy/independence feelings in the local political communities. The process of political alienation and community hatred has been started to nurture further tension and strain in the society, causing problems to the governance of Hong Kong and waiting for any other possible opportunity for exploitation to discredit the central government departments in Hong Kong or the Communist Party of China. Before and after the Handover, Hong Kong has always been the Casablanca of the Far East. One could never deny the activities of undesirable foreign political elements in Hong Kong for clandestine purposes.

Fourth, there are an increasingly large number of people, mostly young people, who are frustrated with their economic and social situation in Hong Kong for various reasons, like low pay and unchallenging jobs, unemployment, poor living conditions, unable to afford home ownership, poor prospect of social mobility and financial improvement and the like.

Some of them may take to the street to attract societal attention and express their frustration. More often they gather themselves in online communities and reinforce each other's frustration and displeasure with the society in discussion. Many of them join anti-Leung and anti-government demonstrations with no definite political ideology, commitment or demand.

In fact, they may be described more as apolitical than political and their inclination is for fun or simply venting out their frustration. They are the most uncontrollable and unpredictable element and if improperly managed, they would turn into a mob. They are also mostly unorganized and could not be managed by the organizers of the demonstrations, but they would also be easily broken up and dispersed under systematic pressure of the police. They just come and go.

With the public affirmation and support of Leung by the most senior leaders in Beijing, the first group of protesters should lose its commitment and determination to support Henry Tang. They may become reluctant supporters of Leung. The third group will also be very secretive and will not go public themselves against Leung and his administration. Even for the second group, despite their anti-Communist ideology, if they find it impossible to collapse the Leung government, many may lose the enthusiasm for demonstrations.

The last group is mostly passive and reactive. If others do not organize demonstrations, they would not organize them by themselves and would simply return to virtual and exclusive online activism. Hence, so long as the central government does not show any sign that might be interpreted as distrusting the Leung administration, there would not be any sustained momentum for the anti-Leung efforts and demonstrations.

The Leung administration should not be intimidated by public demonstrations; in fact the scale of demonstrations was much smaller than one has expected. Instead, it should concentrate its efforts on producing a policy address that will show to the general public its vision of and policies for the coming five years in Hong Kong.

The author is head of China Business Centre, Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

(HK Edition 01/11/2013 page3)