The current uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East can be regarded as the third wave of efforts by Arabs to revive their nations since the end of World War II. The first wave was in the 1950s and 1960s, when national democratic revolutions, such as the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, toppled the monarchies supported by the West. The second wave was the Islamic revival movement of the 1970s and 1980s. Inspired by Jamal-al-Din Afghani, the forerunner of re-Islamization, many Arab politicians sought help from religion. Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden can be seen as a side effect of the second wave.

Now comes the third wave of Arab renaissance. This is a grassroots movement. Unlike the first and the second wave, which were led by elites, the third is led by ordinary people. The Arab world used to be a center of civilization. And like many Chinese, Arabs also see the last two centuries as a period of painful humiliation. Most Arab states still struggle to adjust to a swiftly changing, largely West dominated, and deeply globalized world.

The current Arab uprisings are not only a fight against economic disparity and social injustice, but also a fight for identity and dignity. It is the effort made by the Arab people to seek modernity and regain their rightful place in the world.

To the surprise of many commentators, no radical Islamic forces have played a significant role in the third wave. Unlike the second wave, the Arab renaissance movement is not religious. Even the popular Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has adopted a low-key strategy to fit in the trend. It will contest the upcoming parliamentary election as the Freedom and Justice Party. The Renaissance Party or Nahda, the biggest and best-organized party in Tunisia after the change of guard, has softened its radical stand as well, and regards the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Turkish ruling party, as its model.

Radical Islam, a product of the second wave, has proved to be a liability rather than an asset for many Arab countries. Even before the current Arab uprisings, radical Islam was in decline in the Arab world. After the United States launched the war against terrorism in 2001, a good part of the Muslim world began to realize that Islamic extremism had no future. The so-called Arab Spring of 2011 has manifested that radical Islam is coming to an end. The public has its eyes focused on something else.

As the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have shown, Islamic extremism can have a profound impact on the whole world. The surge of right-wing populism in Europe since the 1990s, to some extent, can be attributed to the flood of pious Muslim immigrants. The radicalization of separatists and extremists in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region afflicts the Chinese government. The waning of Islamic extremism thus bodes well both for China and the West.

Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt illustrates two types of civilizations. Axial Age civilizations emerged with the major world religions around 6th century BC, and the civilization of modernity started with the scientific and technological revolution brought about by European Enlightenment. Different religious traditions have enacted different programs of modernity. Modern societies are therefore not converging on a common path involving industrialism, political democracy, modern welfare states and secularism. And eventually, a global civilization that contains multiple modernities will emerge.