But the real rationale behind Washington's support of the meeting coincides with that of Beijing, namely, to balance the growing "pro-independence" atmosphere in Taiwan. This is prerequisite to the realization that some check on Taiwan "independence" is wise.

Washington is committed to a neither-nor policy regarding unification and independence. Since "pro-independence" sentiment is rising and will probably win big in the election, Washington has to rescue the credibility of the other side. This is important for Washington because once the "pro-independence" mood gets too excited the situation could develop to a level that Beijing can no longer tolerate. This would mean the involvement of Washington in an unnecessary confrontation at a point not of its own choosing. In short, the rationale for Washington to support the meeting is to bring stability to the cross-Straits situation after those in favor of "independence" come to power.

In light of the fact Tsai has remained coy about her intentions to honor the status quo, to which she avoids any mention, her intention to shun the one-China principle is more than apparent. This would change the parameters of the cross-Straits relationship premised upon the 1992 Consensus, which indirectly but specifically sticks to the one-China principle.

Therefore, the meeting will reinforce the current parameter of the one-China principle so that the status quo is crystal clear, even to Tsai, whose rhetorical commitment will thus no longer be required. Indirectly, therefore, Washington is assisting Tsai in stabilizing cross-Straits relationship after her expected victory. For Washington, the meeting checks Taiwan independence only in an instrumental sense. It mainly serves to preempt Beijing from forcing Tsai into corner and then engulfing Washington.

The author is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University.